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Francis Fukayama in his discussion of the Islamist movement
and its threat to modernity utilizes a certain “logic of history.”
Societies through their governments evolve in a gradual, lin-
ear process until they reach a final form characterized by lib-
eral, democratic capitalism—the famous “end of history” the-
sis—as exemplified by Western countries. Fukayama univer-
salizes this conception of history because, according to him, it
is based on the scientific method of interpretation, and, thus,
proceeds to explain the events in the Muslim/Arab world through
this prism of historiography. However, it is the purpose of this
paper to challenge Fukayama’s language of history as being
more ideological rather than scientific, and posit an alternate
and more scientific model of historiography as developed by
Manuel De Landa. Various interpretations of the Islamist move-
ment provide support for De Landa’s method of looking at his-
tory. On a more practical level, the failure of several develop-
ment projects shows the danger of taking on the neo-liberal,
market-oriented vision as the ultimate paradigm for societies,
as advocated by Fukayama.
Francis Fukayama, in his “Has History Started Again” (2002), is
back to arguing his famous “the end of history” thesis: “. . . Histo-
ry understood as the evolution of human societies through differ-
ent forms of government had culminated in modern liberal de-
mocracy and market-oriented capitalism” (2002: 3). Within this
context Fukayama asserts that the September 11 attacks were a
“desperate backlash” against modernity. Apparently, Islam is the
one culture in the world that has inherent conflicts with Western
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institutions. This argument is based on an underlying theory of
history. History for Fukayama is a linear, evolutionary process that
culminates in a final and permanent form. The purpose of this
paper is to challenge this conception of history by putting forth an
alternate non-linear, non-equilibrium (i.e., history does not have
an end state) model, as developed by Manuel De Landa (2000).
First, I will present the criticisms and limitations of Fukayama’s
concept of history as posed by different theorists. De Landa’s the-
ory will be presented as the alternate language of history that an-
swers the legitimate concerns of those who oppose Fukayama’s
logic of history. As support for De Landa’s scheme of historiogra-
phy, I will refer to several interpretations of the Islamist move-
ment, both as a general social phenomenon and one that is specif-
ic to Turkey, taking into account, among other things, the role of
women within this movement. Finally, I would also like to look at
two studies that illustrate some of the contradictions and chal-
lenges faced by development projects that take neo-liberalism as
their absolute ideological paradigm.
Fukayama puts forth his “logic of history”: Western institu-
tions and the values they espouse—democracy, individual rights,
the rule of law, and wealth that results from economic freedom—
are ultimately universal values that the world will aspire to and
make their own if given the opportunity. Like a good positivist,
Fukayama invokes the scientific method in explaining the univer-
sality of Western institutions. He states, “There is an underlying
historical mechanism that encourages a long-term convergence
across cultural boundaries, first and most powerfully in econom-
ics, then in the realm of politics and finally (and most distantly) in
culture” (2002: 4). Science and technology are the basis for the
economic and military success of the West and thus the driving
force of history. As a result all countries must accept that in order
to progress they need to incorporate the methods that have made
Western societies so powerful. Non-Western countries will need
to develop Western institutions in order to effectively apply sci-
ence and technology in their societies.
Historically, according to Fukayama, economic development
engenders the growth of democracy. A middle class forms with
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private property, and its appropriate legal protections, which then
leads to the formation of a complex civil society propped up by an
improving educational system. Another great historical innova-
tion was the separation of church and state, devised specifically to
maintain the peace of a new and dynamic civil society. Fukayama
notes that secularization was an indispensable aspect of modern-
ization, “a great tradition that culminated in the American Decla-
ration of Independence and Constitution” (2002: 4-5).
Fukayama believes that Islamic cultures, particularly Arab coun-
tries, have very real problems with modernity. They are the ones that
have had consistent radical movements which oppose Western poli-
cies and, more fundamentally, religious tolerance, “the basic princi-
ple of modernity of itself” (2002: 5). As a result, Fukayama argues,
the Islamic world today is at the same historical juncture as Europe
during the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century. Radical Is-
lamists have gained popularity because they are offering alternatives
to the social dislocations brought about by mass urbanization, the
concomitant change in values, and the inability of their governments
to bring about economic and political reforms, despite the genuine
assistance of international agencies such as the World Bank.
Clearly, Fukayama sees history as a linear process of evolu-
tion. Developments engender further developments giving com-
plexity and dynamism to society until it reaches a final political
and economic form with a befitting culture. Western Europe and
the United States apparently have reached this ultimate state. My
problem with Fukayama’s discussion of history is that it seems to
be directed by an “invisible hand,” much like Adam Smith’s free
market system. History has a plan and destiny, as if designed by a
divine entity. Consequently, Fukayama’s vision and language of
history takes on a moral quality. Furthermore, this view of history
is also a very Eurocentric one; modernity takes on a very selective
definition, based on the “best” developments in European history
since the seventeenth century. Slavery, racism, imperialism, colo-
nialism, the holocaust, apartheid, etc., are excluded from playing
a role in this definition, and must be perceived as aberrations in
the straight march of progress. Nevertheless, according to Fukaya-
ma, the radical Islamist movement is not a simple aberration; it is
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a clash of civilizations a la Samuel Huntington. The Islamists pose
a genuine threat to the full realization of the final (and moral)
form of society for the countries of the world, the evolution of
Western-style liberal democracies. The West must save the world
and the Islamic societies from themselves. That is why Fukayama
dares to ask the question, “Has History Started Again?”
In response to Fukayama’s question, I agree with Lila Abu-
Lughod (2002) who argues that we must be distrustful of such
messages of salvation: “. . . we need to be suspicious when neat
cultural icons are plastered over messier historical and political
narratives, so we need to be wary when Lord Cromer in British-
ruled Egypt, French ladies in Algeria, and Laura Bush, all with
military troops behind them, claim to be saving or liberating Mus-
lim women” (785). Abu-Lughod is advocating for a new language
of history, one that calls for understanding the complex links be-
tween the different histories of the world, and doing away with
“artificially” created geographical spheres where the world is di-
vided between the “civilized,” and comfortably familiar cultures,
and the “uncivilized,” wholly alien cultures.
Nilufer Gole (1998), who has done work in Istanbul and Hong
Kong trying to understand “non-Western modernities,” discovered
that history does not follow the simple linear narrative of “causal
sequences” as utilized by Fukayama. “Instead, modernization pro-
ceeded asymmetrically according to the specific interaction be-
tween the local cultural fabric and the universal concept of moder-
nity” (Gole 1998: 40). As a result, modernity needs a new defini-
tion taking into account the interaction between local situations and
global influences, and, according to Gole, the language of social
science has not incorporated this method of conceiving modernity.
Social science engages in parochialisms when confronting com-
plex, hard-to-explain realities in history. The social scientific use
of language needs to break with the Enlightenment tradition of con-
ceiving the world solely in terms of particular Western values as
indicated by Fukayama. Gole writes, “In order to arrive at new
prisms of analysis, we need to further de-center the West itself and
look at what once were considered peripheries as centers in their
own right, with their own capacity for creating history” (41).
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S. Sayyid (1998) has done an analysis on Western historiogra-
phy, incorporating the work of Edward Said. Sayyid points out
that the Orientalist could speak for the Orient because of the lan-
guage he uses, which is based on science, rationality, and progress.
Supposedly, this language could be used to “translate” and “tran-
scribe” other languages. The Orientalist emerged from a “super-
cultural formation” largely put into place by Western imperialism.
Consequently, the universalism of Western values is the result of
its political and military success, and its historiography is the prod-
uct of the arrogance that comes with success. Therefore, “[t]he
universalism of the West is a consequence of historiography and
not, as it is too often claimed, a matter of history” (396).
De Landa (2000) provides a philosophy and language of his-
tory that answers the concerns of Abu-Lughod, Gole, and Sayyid,
and he does so using the scientific method of language that Fukaya-
ma claims to use in explaining the historical superiority of West-
ern institutions. However, De Landa attacks the conventional con-
ception of scientific theories as being too simplistic in its notion
of historical processes:
. . . the classical versions of these theories incorporated a rather
weak notion of history into their conceptual machinery: both
classical thermodynamics and Darwinism admitted only one
possible historical outcome, the reaching of thermal equilibri-
um or the fittest design. In both cases, once this point was
reached, historical processes ceased to count. In a sense, opti-
mal design or optimal distribution of energy represented an end
of history for these theories. (13-14)
De Landa looks at more contemporary theories in science that ex-
plain the possibility of a multiplicity of historical outcomes and an
ongoing, dynamic interaction between these outcomes. He bases his
theories on innovative work in the area of thermodynamics. He
makes reference to Ilya Prigogine and his revolutionary discovery
in the 1960s that classical theories in thermodynamics were only
valid for closed systems. In this case energy is always conserved,
resulting in thermal equilibrium. But, if energy is introduced or tak-
en out of the system, pushing the system away from equilibrium, the
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number of possible outcomes increases greatly. Consequently,
“[i]nstead of a unique and simple form of stability, we now have
multiple coexisting forms of varying complexity (static, periodic,
and chaotic attractors)” (2000: 14). In addition, when there are
transformations between stable states, there are “bifurcations,” a
point at which minor fluctuations in energy can play a very signifi-
cant role in determining outcomes. Therefore, according to De Lan-
da, “. . . when we study a given physical system, we need to know
the specific nature of the fluctuations that have been present at each
of its bifurcations; in other words, we need to know its history in
order to understand its current dynamical state” (2000: 14).
These conditions are also true for biological systems. De Lan-
da points out that bifurcations and phases are part of any system in
which its movements of energy are far removed from equilibrium
and “nonlinear,” that is, containing processes that involve power-
ful interactions and feedback between the different components
of that system. Nonlinear dynamics within biology signifies that
there can be no ultimate design as a result of the evolutionary
process as long as there is energy flowing and ensuring the sudden
changes of state and periods of stability within a complex interac-
tive system. De Landa writes:
As biology begins to include these nonlinear dynamical phe-
nomena in its models—for example, the mutual stimulation in-
volved in the case of evolutionary “arms races” between pred-
ators and prey—the notion of a “fittest design” will lose its
meaning. In an arms race there is no optimal solution fixed once
and for all, since the criterion of “fitness” itself changes with
the dynamics. As the belief in a fixed criterion of optimality
disappears from biology, real historical processes come to reas-
sert themselves once more. (14)
Clearly, then, the dynamism of human history must signify that
“the end of history” for human societies also loses its meaning.
De Landa argues that the growing historical concerns within
the natural sciences gives us powerful clues for a nonlinear and
nonequilibrium vision of history. First of all, according to De Lan-
da, the concept of “stages” in human history needs to be done away
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with, at least as it is traditionally understood. Phase transitions do
not bring about developmental “stages” that is an improvement
from the previous one, which has been completely left behind. De
Landa indicates, “On the contrary, much as water’s solid, liquid,
and gas phases may coexist, so each new human phase may simply
add itself to the other ones, coexisting and interacting with them
without leaving them in the past” (2000: 16). Moreover, phases
may revert to previous ones if the conditions so warrant. So, with
the varying flows of energy, we have the possibility of different
phases of history, which not only simultaneously exist in varied
complexities but also interact. De Landa provides a simple exam-
ple which he draws from the physicist Arthur Iberall: when no-
madic societies did “solidify” as during the rule of Genghis Khan,
the “resulting structure was more like glass than crystal, more amor-
phous and less centralized” (2000: 16). However, for De Landa,
this is too simple a metaphor because “inorganic matter-energy
has a wider range of alternatives for the generation of structure
than just these simple phase transitions, and what is true for sim-
ple ‘stuff’ must be all the more so for the complex materials that
form human cultures” (2000: 16). The question that remains now
is how well this language of history fits the reality of “non-West-
ern modernities,” and more specifically the Islamist movement.
According to Gole (1998), state-instituted modernization
projects in non-Western countries, such as the Kemalist project in
Turkey, has meant precisely the coexistence of the different peri-
ods of history. She writes:
What Akbar Abbas has written about Hong Kong could be said
of Istanbul as well: “A space traversed by different times and
speeds, where change has no clear direction . . . a weakening of
the sense of historical sequentiality so that old and new are con-
temporaneous. Continuities and discontinuities exist side by
side. Premodern and postmodern join hands without having to
acknowledge each other.” (41)
The Islamist movement is indeed the result of interactions between
the old and the new, but more a product of “modernization” than a
desire to return to past traditions (Gole 1998, Dorraj 1999). Many
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of the participants of this movement are the product of “modern”
secular and urban institutions like universities. There is also a clear
influence of Western thinkers in their writings (Gole 1998). They
are considered fundamentalist because they do preach a closer fol-
lowing of the Koran and the way Islam was practiced during the
time of the Prophet, but this fundamental approach is also used to
attack the way Islam has been followed and interpreted during the
many centuries succeeding the Prophet in order to effectively po-
liticize their movement (Gole 1998, Dorraj 1999, Houston 1999).
In terms of the experience of women, the Islamist’s method cover-
ing of women is also innovative, plus women have become active
and key players within the movement, which is a break from the
traditional notion of the subservient female (Gole 1998, Dorraj
1999, Kaya 2000). Interestingly, and in accordance with De Lan-
da’s theories on historical coexistence and interaction, the Islam-
ist movement is replete with “hybrid ways of life” (Gole1998),
which arise directly from the movement’s attempt to come to terms
with the social challenges created by “modernization” (Gole 1998,
Dorraj 1999, Houston 1999).
Manochehr Dorraj (1999) provides a lucid interpretation of
the rise of the Islamist movement within the context of the social
upheavals inflicted by the contemporary globalized economy.
Developing countries have not been able to effectively withstand
the social and cultural disruptions caused by rapid industrializa-
tion, urbanization, and population growth. These states have not
had the political and economic capital to respond to serious social
problems and as a result are having to face growing popular un-
rest. The imposition of Western cultural values as part of modern-
ization schemes seem to many in these societies as inauthentic
and cause greater psychological and social disaffection, which in
turn lead to greater political instability. Thus, Dorraj (1999) writes,
“. . . prevailing fragmentation and alienation, as well as the pau-
perization and migration of marginalized groups which often ac-
company the process of uneven economic growth and political
development, give rise to a longing for a sense of community and
belonging” (227). Religious revivalists are reacting to this situa-
tion: they see modern capitalist society providing greater material
113
Challenges to Francis Fukayama’s “End of History” Thesis
comfort, but robbing their societies of important moral values and,
thus, breaking down their communities. Dorraj points out that re-
ligious leaders often see themselves as “guardians of a culture,”
and seeing their culture threatened, “they may resort to the self-
defense mechanism of reviving and revitalizing ties with the past.
Through moral regeneration, they attempt to unite the community
on the basis of a new discipline” (227). Traditional religious insti-
tutions, such as the mosque, come to utilize “modern” methods of
mass mobilization and mass action, often giving new political in-
terpretations to Koranic scripture and, in that way, breaking with
traditional Islamic practices. The Islamist movement is, thus, clearly
a modern phenomenon: as Dorraj writes, “it is not surprising that
in the age of mass ideology and mass politics, the populist rendi-
tion of faith has become a universal phenomenon” (228).
Another factor of the Islamist movement that reflects “mod-
ern” methods, as Dorraj indicates, is the use of civil-society orga-
nizations to counter the extreme sense of powerlessness and infe-
riority that come with poor social conditions. Gole (1998) calls
this a “civil society-centered modernization from below” (40), as
opposed to state-sponsored modernization programs such as Ke-
malism in Turkey. In the Muslim world there has been a growth of
mosques, Islamic banks, health clinics, Islamic seminaries, guilds,
and other associations. According to Dorraj, ‘In the context of the
impersonality of modern life and the pervading social Darwinism
of the market place, these communal-based organizations also of-
fer “a new consciousness, sense of self-worth, and capacity for
action among the poor people”’ (1999: 232). Therefore, we can
see the hybrid ways of life and their interaction creating a new
movement. This fits very well into De Landa’s (2000) philosophy
of history. “Modern” economic forces and powerful social and
cultural transformations associated with modernity have sparked
movements that emphasize certain aspects of tradition, but also
look to de-traditionalize much of Islamic practice in order to em-
ploy “modern” methods of mass mobilization in an attempt to po-
liticize their message. This hybridity is strongly emphasized by
those who make up the Islamist movement: these are often young
people—those who are already a product of the cross-mixing be-
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tween tradition and modernity in their upbringing—emerging from
secular, Western-style institutions, such as the universities, and
many of these activists are women, the portion of the population
that is not supposed to be assertive nor have an active public role
according to traditionally held Islamic beliefs.
A more specific, country-based analysis of the Islamist move-
ment further reflects the complex interaction between different as-
pects of histories. Turkey, in light of recent elections, where a party
with Islamist roots won a strong majority of seats in parliament, is
widely seen as struggling with its “traditional” Islamic identity and
Western modernity. But, according to Christopher Houston’s (1999)
analysis, Islamist movement in Turkey “is subject to all the com-
promises, contradictions and pressures that any social movement
falls prey to while involved in political and economic struggle”
(88). Houston points out the higher Islamist message of brother-
hood among Muslims has been corrupted by nationalist sentiments
in the guise of Islamic belief. The Islamists at times have promoted
an anti-Kurdish agenda. This is interesting considering that they
explicitly claim to be against the Turkish state’s nationalist scheme.
The Kurdish Islamists, in turn, have been emphasizing their own
ethnic Muslim identity. Moreover, Houston adds, in the process of
preaching against the West as the alien “other,” the Islamists seem
to be quite willing to adopt capitalist business methods without
reservation, in the process creating an Islamic middle-class, “a pro-
fessional Islamist counter-elite” (1999: 94), apart from their intel-
lectual leaders. This, in turn, leads to an Islamist discourse that has
to address modern issues of class antagonisms.
Houston’s interpretation of the apparent contradictions above
fits in well with Weber’s discussion on routinization of highly
charged religious movements. The radical Islamist message preach-
es an all-consuming, absolutist message in the name of uniting a
community of believers. However, the need to apply their ideolo-
gy to the every-day practical concerns of society means opening
up alliances with more moderate Muslims and other non-commu-
nist groups, and the necessity to deal with issues of modernity—
i.e., class, gender, and ethnicity—means also being somewhat trans-
formed by these issues. According to Houston, “In the practice of
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Islam, the religious movement is attempting to translate the mod-
ern day, socially, historically, into that religion. But as with all
successful translations, the movement runs the risk of transform-
ing its own syntax in the process” (1999: 94). Indeed, the recently
elected Islamist-based Justice Party in Turkey has been calling
themselves “Muslim democrats” in a deliberate attempt to make
parallels to the Christian Democratic party in Europe. Again, what
we are seeing is a profound interaction of different historical tra-
ditions (Turkish republican, Islamic, and Kurdish) and in the pro-
cess creating new ones, much in the vein of De Landa’s non-linear
and non-equilibrium historical processes.
Ibrahim Kaya’s (2000) study on the role of women in the Turk-
ish Islamist movement provides a further example of the interac-
tions of different traditions. The “veiled women” in this movement
are predominantly urbanized and educated, and, according to Kaya,
there are several factors that inform their participation and activ-
ism. These factors are the different histories that have influenced
the social existence of women in Turkish society. One is the con-
sciousness of a Turkish past before Islam. Turks come from sha-
manistic, nomadic origins. The social life of early Turkic communi-
ties was highly egalitarian and women played a major part in daily
activities. Even later, when Turkic communities had already settled
in Anatolia and converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire,
Kaya emphasizes that at the village level original forms of Turkish
life still prevailed. It also seems very likely that as nomads Turks
were quick to pick up and adopt aspects of the religious life of local
Christian communities. This provides another explanation for the
heterodox Islamic practices of Anatolian Turks. Turkish women
were not at all veiled, as was the custom in the center of Islamic life.
Kaya writes, “This diversity of cultural background may help to
understand why it was relatively easier to let women assert public
roles in the Turkish experience compared with any other Islamic,
and in particular Arabic, societies” (2000: 202). Moreover, the Ke-
malist modernist project also promoted greater female participation
in public life. Women were granted the right to vote in 1934.
The different historical traditions—the pre-Islamic, the local
Anatolian, and the republican—have interacted in ways that have
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influenced the participation of women in the new Islamist move-
ment. This movement, as pointed out, has become a political one
in response to the difficult social and economic conditions of con-
temporary life. Within this context, veiled women have become
“highly militant political actors” (Kaya 2000: 205). The redefini-
tion of Islam as a political movement has meant the emergence of
contradictions. As Kaya points out, though veiled women accept
prescribed roles in society (“inequality,” as Kaya argues it), these
women are out there arguing against the lack of democracy of the
Turkish state. They are pushing for full democratic reforms. Veiled
university women are also fighting for the right to make their own
choices, particularly on the issue of wearing the hijab on public
university campuses. Clearly, the message of Islamist women and
their means of activism reflect a profound interaction with “mo-
dernity” and other historical traditions, creating a new historical
movement. If anything, the contradictions in the movement re-
flect the ongoing process of interaction taking place between the
varied traditions.
Finally, as we have seen, Fukayama’s vision of history in es-
sence asserts an absolute moral vision of a just society. The im-
plicit assumption is that if countries around the world would just
accept the liberal capitalist model of the West, they would look
like Western Europe and North America (excluding Mexico) po-
litically, economically, and culturally (Colburn 2002). This assump-
tion, of course, is very simplistic and naïve. The future of any
country is shaped by its own historical idiosyncrasies, and the in-
teraction of these with both regional and global historical forc-
es. However, development projects around the world, directed by
both international organizations and governments with the aid of
social scientists, have taken on free-market liberalism as their sole
paradigm. As a consequence of their narrow vision, these programs
have had some serious negative impacts on the communities that
they were supposed to help.
Indeed, Julia Elyachar (2000), in her fieldwork in Cairo is one
ethnographer who has been able to assess the anti-poverty programs
funded by international organizations (IOs). She looks at the appar-
ently failed “empowerment” schemes the World Bank and NGOs
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have engaged in since the 1980s. The idea behind these schemes is
to directly help the “people” by providing micro-loans, funded by
the World Bank and other development agencies, to the poor, low-
level entrepreneurs—especially women—of the developing world.
Elyachar points out that the intent of the international organiza-
tions is to support the informal economies of these countries. Ac-
cording to her, “The informal economy is a term that signifies a
social space in which objects, services, and money are exchanged
accordingly to rules of the game other than those sanctioned by the
state” (2002: 496). Thus, she adds, development programs, wheth-
er intentional or not, are diminishing the presence of the state by
expanding the social space of the informal economy, forming a de-
facto free market liberated from the controls of the state.
Elyachar emphasizes that this notion of development for the
“people” in the form of small businesses has become a moral im-
perative, because free-market capitalism has become the ideal in
the post-communist era. NGOs, via micro-loans, support individ-
uals so that they can help themselves and their communities. NGOs
are then deemed as the representatives of the local communities.
Elyachar states, “On the level of politics they [NGOs] are often
taken to collectively represent ‘civil society.’ On the level of econ-
omy, NGOs are often taken to represent the informal economy”
(2002: 497-498). The NGOs are responsible for doling out micro-
loans given by the IOs and other agencies, and are also in charge
of the collection of interest payments for the banks. Elyachar sar-
castically writes, “Although it might seem odd to speak of market-
rate bank interest in the same breath as empowerment, such is the
praxis of micro lending: only market-rate interest builds sustain-
able NGOs, and only market-rate interest allows client self-respect”
(2002: 498).
Elyachar through her interviews in Egypt reveals how the fi-
nancial institutions easily exploit the micro-loan system, while at
the same time putting up the illusion that economic activity is be-
ing generated in the country. Egyptian banks create micro-loans
out of long-term, low-interest grants, or essentially “charity,” as
Elyachar calls it. The grants then get converted into loans with
market-rate interest. “Even before any enterprises are established,
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the economy appears to have grown” (Elyachar 2002: 498). NGOs,
which have won the confidence of local social networks, then be-
come a cheap way of collecting interest payments, and the banks
bring in their profits.
Transnational companies have also found ways to manipulate
the system for profit. Elyachar makes reference to the famous mi-
cro-lending Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and its signing of a con-
tract with the multinational agricultural firm Monsanto which ge-
netically engineers seeds. Monsanto’s plan was to use the “mi-
croloan credit networks,” established by Grameen Bank, to dis-
tribute its seeds, collect their payments, and take disciplinary ac-
tion against those farmers who wanted to reproduce their own seeds
for planting rather than buying from Monsanto. Elyachar points
out that Monsanto’s scheming has revealed that NGOs, through
their inroads into local communities as part of the micro-loan pro-
cess, ironically have become enforcers of big business, rather than
supporters of the people.
What went wrong with the empowerment idea? Elyachar
blames much of this on anthropologists, who, through their stud-
ies of the impoverished in the developing world, have shown a
remarkable admiration for the survival strategies of the poor. Spe-
cifically, anthropologists emphasized the mutual support social
networks found in the local cultures. This aspect of the local cul-
tures soon came to be seen as an economic advantage. Social sci-
entists also saw this aspect of the culture as economically promis-
ing. The informal economy then became recognized by the World
Bank as a means to battle poverty. Studies were undertaken to
understand the survival techniques embedded in the informal econ-
omy. These techniques could then be taught to NGOs and lenders.
As a result, writes Elyachar, “. . . backward cultural practice is
enshrined as a way for the poor to help themselves and the econo-
my at the same time. Unlike earlier methods of development, this
approach displays no attempt to transform craftspeople in Egypt”
(2002: 500). In actuality, the idea is to exploit local peoples by
putting them into debt. In fact, many of the micro-entrepreneurs,
after the establishment of the social fund in Egypt in 1995, “were
desperate. They had debt over their heads, banks on their backs
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demanding interest payments and refusing to release further in-
stallments of the entrepreneur’s loans” (Elyachar 2002: 504). Con-
tracts with borrowers also stipulated in some cases that those late
with payments would be taken to jail.
Elyachar clearly indicates that anthropologists and NGOs both
failed the local people. Social scientists interjected certain value
judgments while carrying out their study of poverty. The anthro-
pologists made their admiration for the self-help social networks
of local communities quite well known. This emphasis on “local
culture” got taken up by the World Bank and NGOs and incorpo-
rated into the prevailing Western neo-liberal, civil society discourse
of economic development. There were, after all, no other seriously
considered ideological alternatives. Thus, the impoverished local
communities were turned over, without any preparation, to the ex-
ploitative and competitive world capitalist free-market. As a result,
local entrepreneurs became indebted rather than empowered.
Like Elyachar, Arturo Escobar (1997) in his study of the grow-
ing black indigenous movement of the Pacific Coast region of Co-
lombia, a rainforest area of incredible biodiversity, strongly as-
serts the importance of incorporating alternative ideologies in de-
velopment projects in order to ensure the health and viability of
local communities. Indeed, state-initiated development projects
have already had a devastating impact on the people of this area,
and the possibility of more is imminent according to Escobar.
The state began pushing for development in the Pacific Coast
region in the early 1980s with the launching of the Plan for the
Integral Development of the Pacific Coast (PLADEICOP) in 1983.
This plan was designed and put into play by the regional develop-
ment corporation, the Autonomous Corporation of the Cauca
(CVC), which was founded with money from the World Bank in
the 1950s. The government’s plans did not include any accounting
of local cultures and conditions. After 1990, the state embarked
on a more “ambitious” plan for the economic opening-up known
as Plan Pacífico, which Escobar claims will have a more “devas-
tating” impact, because it is yet more ill-concerned with the well-
being of the local cultures in its zeal for capitalist development.
Therefore, black and indigenous communities are opposed to the
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plan; they see the language of the plan as threatening in that it
wants to pillage the rich natural resources of the region.
Since state-initiated development projects have begun, there
has been investment in new directions, such as African palm plan-
tations for oil production, artificial shrimp cultivation, hearts of
palm canning, coastal and offshore fishing, shrimp and fish pro-
cessing and packaging for export, and tourism. These investments,
argues Escobar, “[are] producing noticeable cultural ecological,
and social transformations, most visible perhaps in the Tumaco
region . . .” (1997: 209). For instance, he points out that land for
the African palm plantations have been taken by force from black
farmers in some cases and by purchase in others. The result has
been “massive displacement from the land and intensive proletar-
ianization” (Escobar 1997: 209). Workers work as low-wage la-
borers on the plantations, and women work in the shrimp and fish
packaging plants in Tumaco. Each day there is mass migration of
laborers from the river areas to the towns and plantations at pre-
dawn, and at night they return without being able to farm their
own plots. In addition, because of the dramatic growth of popula-
tion, poverty has taken on different forms with the crowding of
slums such as in Tumaco, whose population has doubled in less
than a decade. The built-up of infrastructure for the new economy
has also meant a disruption in the “fragile” balance of the river/
sea ecosystem. Consequently, Escobar states, “Science and capi-
tal thus operate as apparatuses of capture that have remade and
disciplined the landscape, money, and labor alike in one single,
complex operation” (1997: 9). The political reaction to all this has
come in the form of a new black elite who want to have some say
in the development projects and in the process “modernize” their
culture and institutions.
Escobar utilizes a language of history similar to the one advo-
cated by De Landa in describing the black ethnic movement of the
Colombian littoral. He states, “New ecological, cultural, and po-
litical orders are continuously being crafted at the local level as
communities are brought into the politics of development, capital,
and expert knowledge. There is a connection between history, iden-
tity, and meanings” (Escobar 1997: 213). The indigenous cultures
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of the rainforest have very different cultural-ecological patterns
than that called for by Western modernity. Escobar points out that
the extent that local cultures will be able to determine the future
of the rainforest in their favor depends on the strength of their
social movements, the degree they can appropriate new meanings
and utilize them for their own purposes, and link them to “other
identities, circuits of knowledge, and political projects” (1997:
213-214). This sounds much like the Islamist movement, particu-
larly as it is taking shape in Turkey, which is in the process of
linking different historical traditions in order to more effectively
articulate a political objective.
In conclusion, Fukayama’s logic and language of history needs
to be rejected, if for no other reason than its claim to be universal.
Its “universalism” stems from the belief that this understanding of
history is based on the scientific method: history is a linear evolu-
tionary process of developmental stages engendering later stages
of greater complexity until a final form (equilibrium) is reached,
thus “the end of history.” However, this view of the scientific
method is ultimately a very simplistic one, as De Landa (2000)
illustrates. He looks at the processes of thermodynamics and bio-
logical evolution but in an open system, as opposed to a closed
system in the classic (Fukayaman) sense. An open system is not
about “stages” that lead to “better” (notice the value-laden term)
and more developed stable forms, leaving earlier “stages” com-
pletely behind. It is a question of multiple-existing forms of dif-
fering complexities that can lead in new directions with just mi-
nor fluctuations in energy. It is a complex interactive system that,
as long as there is energy coursing through the system, can result
in new outcomes. This new language of history is supported by
the various interpretations of the Islamist movement. This social
phenomenon is the result of the intermixing of various historical
realities. Some of these have to do with broad historical identities
such as “modernity” and the varied and complex social and polit-
ical aspects associated with this term, and Islam, its practices and
values. Other realities have to do with more specific pre-Islamic
identities and local cultural conditions. The result is a contempo-
rary movement that is detraditionalizing Islam and positing a dif-
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ferent direction in politics. In other words, it is a movement that is
much more dynamic than the simple labels of “anti-Western or
“anti-modern” imply. Furthermore, these labels reflect a dismiss-
ive attitude that could only come by taking on Fukayama’s West-
ern liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism as one’s ul-
timate social, and moral, paradigm. The study of different devel-
opment projects reveal the damage a narrow vision can have on
local communities. The practical application of policy requires a
scheme of analysis as outlined by De Landa.
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